Abstract. The Piantedosi Decree (Decree-Law no. 1/2023) allows the administrative detention (fermo amministrativo) of a vessel that fails to comply with the instructions of the competent coordination centre. Where that centre is Libyan, the sanction presupposes that the Italian legal order gives binding force to the instructions of a fragmented authority that has no place of safety to offer and that, according to the United Nations, is implicated in crimes against humanity. This article argues that no domestic provision, nor the Constitution, permits such an automatic effect. A Libyan instruction is relevant only if it is «lawfully given» and consistent with international obligations; otherwise, failure to comply with it is not an offence but the performance of a duty.
1. Introduction: the question
The way the Piantedosi Decree is applied in practice raises a question that goes beyond individual cases: can failure to comply with an instruction from the so-called Libyan authorities constitute, in itself, an administrative offence punishable by detention of the vessel?
2. The legal framework: the «national authority» and the «competent coordination centre»
Decree-Law no. 1/2023, converted by Law no. 15/2023, inserted paragraphs 2-bis and 2-sexies into Article 1 of Decree-Law no. 130/2020. The sanctions regime was later amended by Article 11 of Decree-Law no. 145/2024, converted by Law no. 187/2024, which made the length of detention variable (ten to twenty days; thirty to sixty days for repeat violations).
The wording of the law is the first argument, and the most overlooked. The first sentence of paragraph 2-sexies penalises the master or shipowner who fails to provide the information requested by the «competent national authority for search and rescue at sea» or fails to comply with «their instructions». The rule concerns the Italian authority. Instructions from a foreign authority fall outside it, and extending a punitive provision by analogy is prohibited (Article 25(2) of the Constitution; Article 1 of Law no. 689/1981).
The foreign authority appears only in the opening words of paragraph 2-bis, which define the rescue operations exempted from the ban-or-restriction power under paragraph 2. These are operations notified «to the competent maritime rescue coordination centre in whose area of responsibility the event takes place» and carried out in compliance with the instructions of those authorities. The last sentence of paragraph 2-sexies extends the sanction to cases where, after a port has been assigned, one of the conditions of paragraph 2-bis turns out not to be met.
The same provision, however, qualifies the relevant instructions. They must be «issued on the basis of the obligations arising from the international conventions on the law of the sea, the [ECHR] and national, international and European rules on the right of asylum». Not every communication from the foreign centre is therefore an «instruction» within the meaning of the law. Only one that actually meets these standards is.
The higher-ranking framework is well known: Article 98 UNCLOS (Law no. 689/1994); the SOLAS Convention (Law no. 313/1980), Chapter V; the Hamburg SAR Convention (Law no. 147/1989) and its Annex, paras. 1.3.2 and 3.1.9; the IMO Guidelines, Res. MSC.167(78); Article 33 of the Geneva Refugee Convention (Law no. 722/1954); Article 3 ECHR and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4; Article 19 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; Article 19 of Legislative Decree no. 286/1998. All these sources enter the domestic order through Articles 10(1) and 117(1) of the Constitution.
3. Who are the so-called Libyan authorities
The expression «so-called Libyan authorities» is not a polemical one: it describes a legal problem. The issue is not the international recognition of the Tripoli government, with which Italy maintains relations. The issue is whether the body issuing the instruction is actually capable of performing the SAR coordination function in compliance with the Hamburg Convention.
Three facts rule this out.
a) Institutional fragmentation. The Court of Cassation has found that Libya could not be regarded as a unitary State with unified rescue coordination authorities. The final report of the UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission notes the emergence of parallel State authorities (UN Doc. A/HRC/52/83, 20 March 2023). Communications at sea come variously from the Tripoli MRCC, patrol boats, oil platforms or unidentified personnel.
b) The SAR region and the 2017 Memorandum. The Libyan SAR region was notified to the IMO in 2018, on the strength of the Italian and European technical and financial support provided for by the Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding of 2 February 2017, since tacitly renewed. The Memorandum was never submitted for parliamentary authorisation of ratification under Article 80 of the Constitution. Its political nature rules out its capacity to affect fundamental rights or to supply the content of a punitive provision. The delimitation of a SAR region, moreover, confers no sovereignty: it serves only the effectiveness of rescue operations (Constitutional Court no. 101/2025, para. 25 of the Considerato in diritto).
c) No place of safety. Libya is not a party to the 1951 Geneva Convention. The UN Mission found reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity were committed against migrants in places of detention under the actual or nominal control of, among others, the Libyan Coast Guard, and recommended that the international community cease all support to those actors (A/HRC/52/83, cit.; see also OHCHR, A/HRC/56/70, 3 June 2024).
A SAR authority whose intervention ends with the return of survivors to Libya cannot designate a place of safety within the meaning of para. 3.1.9 of the SAR Annex and para. 6.12 of Res. MSC.167(78). Its coordination is, by definition, incomplete: a rescue is concluded only upon disembarkation in a place of safety.
Finally, one issue remains open that the Constitutional Court expressly excluded from the thema decidendum (judgment no. 101/2025, para. 16): the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State on the high seas (Articles 92 and 94 UNCLOS), already emphasised by the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber, 1 August 2022, joined cases C-14/21 and C-15/21, Sea Watch).
4. Constitutional Court no. 101/2025: the lawfulness of the instruction as an element of the offence
In judgment no. 101 of 8 July 2025, the Constitutional Court declared unfounded the questions raised by the Tribunal of Brindisi (order of 10 October 2024, Ocean Viking case). As regards Articles 10 and 117 of the Constitution, the ruling is an interpretative dismissal. Its binding content lies in the reasoning, which the court hearing the opposition is bound to apply.
Punitive nature of detention. Detention is a substantively criminal sanction under the Engel criteria (paras. 11.1 and 11.3). The constitutional guarantees governing criminal penalties therefore apply: legality, precision and foreseeability of the punishable conduct (para. 10, referring to judgment no. 78/1967).
Instructions «lawfully given». Non-compliance is relevant only if the requests and instructions are «lawfully given» and consistent with the Hamburg Convention and the other rules on rescue at sea. Non-compliance cannot be punished as such, but only where it concerns a measure that is lawful both formally and substantively (para. 13.5). The court must therefore verify in each case whether the act conforms to the legal model, as it does under Article 650 of the Criminal Code.
Primacy of rescue. An order that would lead to a breach of the primary duty to save human life, or put it at risk, is not binding, and non-compliance with it cannot be punished (para. 26). Non-refoulement is ius cogens (para. 27, referring to Cass. pen., Sec. VI, no. 15869/2022, Vos Thalassa, and ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 23 February 2012). A rescue is concluded only upon disembarkation in a place of safety (para. 24, referring to Cass. pen., Sec. III, no. 6626/2020, Rackete).
Burden of proof and culpability. No sanction may be imposed where compliance would conflict with higher-ranking principles. The Administration bears the burden of alleging and proving the constituent elements of the offence and the lawfulness of the measures (para. 32, referring to Cass., Joint Sections, no. 20930/2009). Intent or negligence is also required (Article 3 of Law no. 689/1981), and insufficient evidence exonerates the alleged offender (Article 6(11) of Legislative Decree no. 150/2011).
What the Court did not say. The judgment does not declare that Libya is not a place of safety: it reports the arguments of the referring court and the parties (para. 15). Para. 31, indeed, warns that trust between SAR authorities can be undermined only by evidence drawn from official, current sources, based on objective data and recognised by the Republic. Anyone challenging a Libyan instruction must therefore produce such sources, starting with the UN reports cited in para. 15. The characterisation of Libya as an unsafe place should instead be attributed to the case law of the Court of Cassation.
5. Case law of the Court of Cassation and the lower courts
Cass. pen., Sec. V, 1 February 2024, no. 4557 (Asso Ventotto). The Court upheld the conviction of the master of an Italian tug who, in July 2018, had handed 101 survivors over to a Libyan patrol boat. The offences were abandonment of minors or incapacitated persons (Article 591 of the Criminal Code) and unlawful disembarkation and abandonment of persons (Article 1155 of the Navigation Code). The handover amounted to a collective push-back to an unsafe port, because Libya is not a party to the Geneva Convention and the migrants were exposed to inhuman treatment in detention centres. The master of a private vessel acts as a person entrusted with a public service as regards rescue.
The judgment contains a passage that is decisive for the present topic. The defence of lawful order was rejected because the instruction came from an alleged Libyan officer who was never identified. An order with exculpatory effect could come only from the competent coordination centre, or from Rome on a subsidiary basis. The Court of Cassation, therefore, is not satisfied with a «Libyan» origin: it requires the authority to be identified and the order's lawfulness to be verified.
Cass. pen., Sec. VI, no. 15869/2022 (Vos Thalassa) held that the resistance offered by survivors to a return to Libya ordered by the coordination centres was justified by necessity. In July 2018, Libya was not a place of safety. Cass. pen., Sec. III, no. 6626/2020 (Rackete) clarified that the duty to rescue is fulfilled only by disembarkation in a place of safety.
Lower-court case law following judgment no. 101/2025 applies these principles to detentions under the Piantedosi Decree.
Court of Appeal of Catanzaro, 24 September 2026 (Humanity 1), reversing the Tribunal of Crotone (February 2025), declared the detention unlawful. The Libyan patrol boat had already begun the rescue and some migrants had jumped into the sea to reach the humanitarian vessel. For the Court, competence over the SAR region does not in itself make Tripoli's orders lawful: it must be verified whether the Libyan intervention was compatible with international law and whether the survivors would realistically have been disembarked in a place of safety.
Tribunal of Ortona, 9 July 2026 (Humanity 1), declared unlawful the detention ordered in December 2025 for failure to communicate with the Libyan coordination centre.
Tribunal of Ragusa, no. 379/2026 and Tribunal of Catania, 18 February 2026.
The common thread is clear. The fact that an instruction comes from a coastal authority is not enough to ground a sanction. The court must establish whether that instruction, if followed, would have taken the survivors to a place of safety.
6. The paradox of the sanctioned conduct: to obey is to break the law
If the Libyan instruction were binding as such, the master would be caught between two offences. By leaving a distress case already under way, or by facilitating the return of survivors to Libya, the master would incur criminal liability. Relevant offences include failure to assist vessels or persons in danger (Article 1158 of the Navigation Code), abandonment of minors or incapacitated persons (Article 591 of the Criminal Code) and unlawful disembarkation and abandonment (Article 1155 of the Navigation Code), as established in the Asso Ventotto case. By continuing the rescue, the master would suffer the administrative penalty and the detention of the vessel.
The legal order cannot demand both courses of conduct. The conflict is resolved at the level of the sources: the duty to rescue and the prohibition of refoulement prevail, because they are protected by Articles 2, 10 and 117 of the Constitution and by peremptory norms. The Constitutional Court has said so expressly (judgment no. 101/2025, paras. 26 and 32).
Three consequences follow under Law no. 689/1981.
No offence. An instruction not «lawfully given», or not «issued on the basis» of international obligations, does not fall within Article 1(2-bis) of Decree-Law no. 130/2020. The conduct is not defined as an offence (Article 1 of Law no. 689/1981).
Ground excluding liability. Even if the conduct fell within the offence, it would amount to the performance of a duty imposed by a legal rule and protected by criminal law (Article 4 of Law no. 689/1981; Article 51 of the Criminal Code).
Mental element and evidence. Against a background that the Court itself describes as «fragmented», a master who has informed all the authorities and followed Italian coordination is not negligent. The burden of proving that the instruction was lawful lies with the Administration (Article 3 of Law no. 689/1981; Article 6(11) of Legislative Decree no. 150/2011; judgment no. 101/2025, para. 32).
7. Conclusions
The Italian legal order does not declare the Libyan authorities unlawful as such. However, it gives their instructions no automatic binding force. The sanctioning rule in the first sentence of Article 1(2-sexies) of Decree-Law no. 130/2020 concerns the national authority. Paragraph 2-bis refers to the instructions of the foreign centre only if they are issued on the basis of international obligations and asylum law. The Constitutional Court has made the formal and substantive lawfulness of the instruction an element of the offence, to be proved by the Administration.
It follows that the court hearing the opposition cannot simply note that the vessel «did not comply». It must establish who issued the instruction, in what form and through which channel. Above all, it must establish whether following it would have taken the survivors to a place of safety. Where the instruction amounts to abandoning a distress case, or to a return to Libya, non-compliance is not an offence but the fulfilment of the first duty of anyone at sea.
The Piantedosi Decree remains in force. Its application, however, cannot rest on deference to an authority that the legal order itself, through its higher-ranking sources and its case law, does not allow to be regarded as a guarantor of fundamental rights.
https://www.studiolegalecentore.it/en/#contatti
Sources
Constitutional Court, judgment no. 101/2025, full text (Consulta OnLine)
Constitutional Court, judgment no. 101/2025, headnote no. 46812
P. Serrao, La Libia non è un "Paese sicuro", Giustizia Insieme, 22 February 2024
Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya, final report, A/HRC/52/83
Court of Appeal of Catanzaro, Humanity 1, report (Il Fatto Quotidiano, 8 October 2026)